

Future Training Concepts

A Monograph
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AY 2009

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 06-11-2009	2. REPORT TYPE SAMS Monograph	3. DATES COVERED (From - To) January 2009 - December 2009			
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Future Training Concepts		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER			
		5b. GRANT NUMBER			
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER			
6. AUTHOR(S) MAJ Chadwick W. Shields, United States Army		5d. PROJECT NUMBER			
		5e. TASK NUMBER			
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) 250 Gibbon Avenue Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2134		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER			
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)			
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)			
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT The United States Army is currently at a major crossroads with respect to training. Experiences from the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the introduction of Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations, and its equal importance placed on offensive operations, defensive operations, and stability operations, combined with the necessity to be prepared for future conflicts all present a complex problem for Army. Further complicating the situation is increasingly limited resources for the military. The lack of resources includes limited time available to train due to a very demanding operational tempo and finite defense funding. In light of these issues, the Army leadership is faced with making training decisions that not only affect today's fight, but also future operations. Based on this analysis of the Army's current operational environment, national strategy documents, and the future operational environment, the Army should prepare for the next mission or conflict by training on core tasks which span the spectrum of conflict, increase focus on leadership training, and train intangible attributes such as discipline, adaptability, initiative, and problem solving skills.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Training, Future Operational Environment, Field Manual 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations, Future Training Concepts.					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)	17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT (U)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 63	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Stefan J. Banach COL, U.S. Army
			19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) 913-758-3302		

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Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8/98)

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Abstract

FUTURE TRAINING CONCEPTS by Major Chadwick W. Shields, US Army, 53 pages.

The United States Army is currently at a major crossroads with respect to training. Experiences from the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the introduction of Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, and its equal importance placed on offensive operations, defensive operations, and stability operations, combined with the necessity to be prepared for future conflicts all present a complex problem for Army. Further complicating the situation is increasingly limited resources for the military. The lack of resources includes limited time available to train due to a very demanding operational tempo and finite defense funding. In light of these issues, the Army leadership is faced with making training decisions that not only affect today's fight, but also future operations.

No one can predict where, when, why, and how the next conflict will be fought. If the nation calls upon the Army to accomplish an objective, the Army must be prepared to achieve success. As General Peter W. Chiarelli, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, states, "It is simply impossible to plan and train for every possible scenario our Soldiers and their leaders may encounter within the complex reality of the contemporary operating environment." The decisions made today regarding how the Army should train are the cornerstone for success during the next conflict or task.

To determine what the future training concepts of the Army should be, this monograph reviews three areas which develop how the Army should train for future operations. The three areas which impact future training are the requirements given to Army from the Army's current operations, national strategy documents, and finally the future operational environment. Integrated into the analysis of those three areas is an analysis of the Army's current training doctrine from Field Manual 7-0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations* to determine the current training doctrine prepares the Army for its future operations. The analysis addresses how the Army can best train for future operations when it has a wide range of missions, a lack of time to train, is preoccupied with current operations, is facing a complex and ambiguous future operating environment, and shrinking resources. Adding to the problem is a training doctrine which does not fully prepare the Army for future operations and take into account the current operational environment. Finally the monograph presents recommendations for preparing the Army for future operations.

Based on this analysis of the Army's current operational environment, national strategy documents, and the future operational environment, the Army should prepare for the next mission or conflict by training on core tasks which span the spectrum of conflict, increase focus on leadership training, and train intangible attributes such as discipline, adaptability, initiative, and problem solving skills. The Army does not have enough time and resources to train for every mission and conflict, and focusing on a core task list which spans the spectrum of conflict, it can adapt those core skills to succeed in an ambiguous and complex future. Complimenting the core competency task list is an increased focus on leaders and leadership training. Future leaders must have the attributes necessary to succeed in a complex and constantly changing operating environment. The intangible attributes required by not only leaders, units and Soldiers are discipline, initiative, problem solving skills, and adaptability.

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Introduction

The United States Army is currently at a major crossroads with respect to training. Experiences from the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the introduction of Army Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, and its equal importance placed on offensive operations, defensive operations, and stability operations, combined with the necessity to be prepared for future conflicts all present a complex problem for Army. Further complicating the situation are increasingly limited resources for the military, which include limited time available to train due to a demanding operational tempo and finite defense funding. In light of these issues, the Army leadership is faced with making training decisions that not only affect today's fight, but also future operations.

No one can predict where, when, why, and how the next conflict will be fought. If the nation calls upon the Army to accomplish a task, the Army must be prepared to achieve success. As General Peter W. Chiarelli, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, states, "It is simply impossible to plan and train for every possible scenario our Soldiers and their leaders may encounter within the complex reality of the contemporary operating environment."¹ The decisions made today regarding how the Army should train are the cornerstone for success during the next conflict or task.

An appropriate example of the consequences of training for the next conflict is the development of militaries during the inter-war years between World War I and World War II. During the interwar years some nations successfully developed and trained their armies for the

¹ Peter W. Chiarelli, "Training Full Spectrum- Less is More By: GEN Peter W. Chiarelli, VCSA." Combined Arms Center Blog, <http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/blog/blogs/guestblog/archive/2009/06/30/> accessed 28 August 2009, 2.

next conflict, while others did not. Actions on the battlefield clearly showed the effects of the decisions made by nations in the years preceding the war. An example of successful preparation is the German Army leadership's creation of an organization that developed employment doctrine and organizational attributes such as initiative and adaptability for their armored force. Due to their efforts, Germany dominated the European theater of operations for the first three years of WWII.² A military that did not possess a structure or training doctrine necessary to support innovation and adaptation was the US Army during the interwar years. Lacking both of these, the US Army entered WWII without an effective armored warfare doctrine.³ In order to examine how the United States Army can avoid being unprepared for future missions and conflicts, this study focuses on developing training concepts the United States Army should use in training.

To determine future Army training concepts, this monograph reviews three areas which determine how the Army should train for future operations. The three areas which impact future training are the requirements given to Army from the Army's current operations, United States national strategy documents, and finally the anticipated future operational environment.

Integrated into the analysis of those three areas is an analysis of the Army's current training doctrine from Field Manual 7-0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations* to determine how the current training doctrine prepares the Army for its future operations. The analysis addresses how the Army can best train for future operations when it has a wide range of missions, a lack of time to train, preoccupied with current operations, facing a complex and ambiguous future operating environment, and finite resources. Adding to the problem is a training doctrine which does not

² Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, eds., *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 34-45.

³ Jonathan House, *Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century* (Lawrence, Kansas: The University of Kansas Press, 2001) 64-69.

fully prepare the Army for future operations and take into account the current operational environment. Finally the monograph presents recommendations for preparing the Army for future operations.

Based on this analysis of the Army's current operational environment, national strategy documents, and the future operational environment, the Army should prepare for the next mission or conflict by training on core tasks which span the spectrum of conflict, increase focus on leadership training, and train intangible attributes such as discipline, adaptability, initiative, and problem solving skills. The Army does not have enough time and resources to train for every mission and conflict, and focusing on a core task list which spans the spectrum of conflict, it can adapt those core skills to succeed in an ambiguous and complex future. Complimenting the core competency task list is an increased focus on leaders and leadership training. Future leaders must have the attributes necessary to succeed in a complex and constantly changing operating environment. The intangible attributes required by leaders, units, and Soldiers as well are discipline, initiative, problem solving skills, and adaptability.

Methodology

The criteria utilized in this examination of future training concepts is based on Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch's "Failure to Adapt" as presented in their book *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*. They state, "Unexpected tasks must be delegated quickly and efficiently and competing demands resolved speedily and wisely. The requirements to adapt to unexpected circumstances tests both organization and system, revealing weaknesses that are

partly structural and partly functional, whose full potential for disaster may not previously have been noticed.”⁴

Section two, Current Operational Environment, discusses the current operational environment and Army Chief of Staff General George W. Casey Jr.’s comments on two challenges to the Army’s future success: restoring balance and setting conditions for future operations. The section assesses the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the implications of those operations on training. Next is a review of the Israeli conflict with Hezbollah in 2006 and the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. The two operations deserve analysis in order to gain insight into future conflicts beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. Incorporated into the section is a discussion of the current training doctrine found in Field Manual 7-0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations*.⁵ The review contains a summary of the current training doctrine regarding the Mission Essential Task List and how doctrine incorporates the current operational environment, Army force generation, modularization, principles of training, and the Army training system. Finally this section examines General Casey’s comments on setting the conditions for future operations by presenting the necessity for the Army to incorporate training intangible skills such as discipline, initiative, and problem solving which allows the Army to adapt a core competency task list across the spectrum of conflict.

Section three, Army Mission Guidance, investigates the guidance given to the Army by the United States government in national strategy documents in order to determine future missions and roles for the Army. The section then methodically reviews the national security

⁴ Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War* (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 161.

⁵ US Department of the Army, Field Manual 7-0, *Training For Full Spectrum Operations*. (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army December 2008), iii.

documents published by the President of the United States in the National Security Strategy, the Department of Defense in the National Defense Strategy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the National Military Strategy, and in other documents such as the Quadrennial Defense Review Report published by the Department of Defense. The purpose to the review is to fully determine the written requirements and missions of the Army in order to base future training decisions. The section also reviews three current public arguments on how the Army should train to prepare for future missions and operations. Following these three arguments, General Chiarelli's concept of training a core task list is explored and expanded on.

Section four, Future Operational Environment, examines the future operational environment in which the Army could face in its next operation. Security trends, challenges and threats are examined in order to anticipate how to mitigate and overcome the problems it faces while accomplishing assigned missions and tasks. The section discusses the importance of leadership and leadership development to compliment the core competency task list and the training of the intangible skills which allow units to adapt to a complex and changing mission set.

The conclusion provides a summary of the monograph and draws the major relationships and concepts between today's training crossroads and the Army's direction of training. The future training system of the Army must inherently instill the ability for leaders, units, and Soldiers to adapt to the uncertainty and complexity in the next conflict or mission or risk catastrophic failure such as Task Force Smith in the beginning of the Korean War. The findings of the analysis is that the Army can best train for future operations by focusing on core tasks spanning the spectrum of conflict, developing discipline, initiative, problem solving and other intangible skills, and focusing on leader development which will allow leaders, units and Soldiers to successful adapt to a complex and unknown future and lead to success on the battlefield.

Additionally, the conclusion identifies recommendations and knowledge gaps which require additional study regarding the conduct of training the Army for future operations. The recommendations of the study include developing a training doctrine which incorporates training

core competency tasks which span the spectrum of conflict, focus doctrine and training on development of the intangible skills necessary for adaptation such as problem solving, basic skills mastery, initiative, and discipline, and finally creating centers of expertise regarding the spectrum of conflict in order to retain competency and knowledge. The areas requiring additional study include development of the core competency list, incorporation of future national strategy documents into the future training concept, and the training strategy for leadership which facilitates adaptability of the core competency tasks in the future operating environment.

Current Operational Environment

Integral to determining future training concepts for the Army is an examination of the current operational environment. Along with the missions and tasks given to the Army by the nation and the Department of Defense in the formal national strategy documents, the operational environment determines the conditions on how those tasks and missions are achieved. The operational environment also has the potential to require the Army to undertake missions and tasks not stated in the strategic guidance due to changes in threats, abilities, conditions, and actions in the Army's operational area. The current operational environment consists of the operations the Army is presently involved in, the types of conflict occurring internationally, and the Army's training doctrine from Field Manual 7-0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations*.

Current Army Operations

Since September 11, 2001 the Army has been in persistent conflict for over seven years. As of October 2008, 250,000 soldiers are deployed in eighty countries. Of those soldiers, 140,000 are deployed in combat zones. In those seven years, the Army transformed from an Army focused on stability operations such as Bosnia/Kosovo and training on high intensity operations to an Army that is seasoned in conflict and focused on counterinsurgency operations. Soldiers providing security, training local security forces, and assisting governance in Iraq and

Afghanistan are facing a complex and extremely dynamic threat environment from an adaptive and learning enemy.⁶

General George W. Casey Jr. states, “As we look to the future, national security experts are virtually unanimous in predicting that the next several decades will be ones of persistent conflict- protracted confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors that are increasingly willing to use violence to achieve political and ideological ends.” He describes the current operational environment presenting two challenges to the Army’s future success: restoring balance and setting conditions for future operations.⁷

The concept of restoring balance refers to providing units more time at home station between deployments in order to train, reset, and recover before being deployed again, essentially moving toward the Army Force Generation model. The Army is accomplishing this by increasing personnel strength to 1.1 million soldiers, conducting modular transformation, and executing base realignment and closure.⁸ In setting conditions for future operations General Casey states while the nature of land conflict is unpredictable, land forces must possess the qualities of versatility, expeditionary, agile, lethal, sustainable, and interoperable in order to succeed in the future.⁹ Both challenges General Casey present, restoring balance and setting conditions for future operations, greatly affect training. General Casey’s comments generate two areas for further review. The first is an examination of the qualities he states the Army must have to succeed: versatility, expeditionary, agile, lethal, sustainable, and interoperability which will be discussed below. The

⁶ Pete Geren, “Today’s Army- Ready Today, Preparing for Tomorrow,” *Army*, (October 2008): 14-15.

⁷ George W. Casey Jr., “America’s Army in an Era of Persistent Conflict,” *Army*, (October 2008): 19.

⁸ Ibid., 20.

⁹ Ibid., 25-26.

next is additional analysis of restoring balance with regards to training which will be discussed in the national strategic guidance section.

Integral in the development of a training concept is what attributes leaders, units, and Soldiers must have in order to succeed on a complex and uncertain operational environment. While the attributes General Casey present are appropriate to the Army in general, additional analysis is required focusing on training and what is required to be successful on the next conflict or mission.

In answering what skills are needed to be successful in future operations, author Peter R. Mansoor presents a definition and outlines contributors to combat effectiveness in his book *The GI Offensive in Europe*. He states combat effectiveness “is the ability of a military organization to achieve its assigned missions with the least expenditure of resources (both material and human) in the shortest amount of time.”¹⁰ Combat effectiveness consists of three factors- human, organizational, and technical- and has two components: endurance and time.

The human factors of combat effectiveness are leadership and discipline. Leadership is the most important aspect of combat effectiveness and is a single point of failure in combat. Discipline is the cornerstone of organizations and allows units to succeed under complex and difficult conditions. Organizational factors include weapons, equipment, and how they are organized; doctrine and how units conduct operations; command and control and interservice cooperation; and perhaps the most important aspect of the organizational factors: adaptability. Mansoor states the technological factors are important to combat effectiveness, but not decisive.

¹⁰ Peter R. Mansoor, *The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999) 3.

It facilitates the activities of warfighting functions, and is only significant if there is an overwhelming unbalance of capabilities with mitigating factors.¹¹

Mansoor's model of combat effectiveness also has two components, endurance and time. Endurance is the ability of an army to sustain its self during operations. Without endurance, units will ultimately fail over the course of operations. Time is a critical component of combat effectiveness. Sustainability, training, and preparation are affected by time and it both hinders and assists combat effectiveness.¹²

S. L. A. Marshall presents another perspective on the skills needed for unit success on the battlefield. In his book *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command*, he emphasizes, during his argument firepower, the importance of teamwork, cohesion and communication on the battlefield. He also maintained that “man” is the most important factor in warfare.¹³

The last perspective discussing the qualities and skills an army needs to be successful is presented by Martin Van Creveld in his book, *Fighting Power*. Van Creveld defines “fighting power” as the sum total of mental qualities that make armies fight. It rests on mental, intellectual, and organizational foundations; its manifestations, in one combination or another, are discipline and cohesion, morale and initiative, courage and toughness, the willingness to fight and the readiness, if necessary, to die.” He also argues those qualities are the same qualities successful armies have possessed for over 2000 years. The only way those traits are acquired is through

¹¹ Peter R. Mansoor, *The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American infantry Divisions, 1941-1945*, 2.

¹² Ibid., 3-4.

¹³ S. L. A. Marshall, *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command* (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000) 1-11.

tough and realistic training.¹⁴ Based on these three opinions and General Casey's six attributes, the intangible skills needed for successful operations that can be developed from a training concept are discipline, adaptability, leadership, initiative, unit cohesion, teamwork, and communication. Underlying all of the intangible skills and arguably the most important is leadership. Former Army Chief of Staff General Peter J. Schoomaker states in the 2006 Field Manual 6-22, *Army Leadership*, "Competent leaders of character are necessary for the Army to meet the challenges in the dangerous and complex security environment we face."¹⁵

Complimenting leadership is discipline within a unit. Discipline facilitates adherence to standards, compliance with orders, and cohesiveness during stress and uncertainty. Another important attribute is initiative. Initiative is the ability of subordinates to accomplish a task without specific direction or oversight. In complex environments, a commander cannot be everywhere on the battlefield and subordinates must have initiative to accomplish the intent of the commander. Adaptability is the overarching attribute for success in future operations. Adaptability is the ability of a leader or organization to adjust as necessary to enable success when faced with a new and complex situation. S. L. A. Marshall's attributes of unit cohesion, teamwork, and communication are all facilitators for the other attributes and allow units to adapt to complex situations more readily.¹⁶

¹⁴ Martin Van Creveld, *Fighting Power: German and U. S. Army Performance, 1939-1945* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982) 1.

¹⁵ US Department of the Army, *Field Manual 6-22, Army Leadership*, (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, October 2006) forward.

¹⁶ S. L. A. Marshall, *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command*, 1-11.

Recent Military Actions

Another component of the current operational environment is recent military actions. Along with American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, analysis of other recent conflicts can help determine future training requirements by showing the tactics, equipment, and doctrine of various groups and nations. An example of a conflict showcasing tactics and doctrine before a major conflict is the Spanish Civil War before World War II. During the Spanish Civil War, Germany participated with both equipment and troops, utilizing the war as a testing ground for future tactics and doctrine. Germany successfully used the lessons learned from their operations in Spain to develop the doctrine used in World War II.¹⁷

Besides the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, two other conflicts deserve analysis. They are the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia and the 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War. In August 2008, Russian military forces successfully invaded Georgia in a conventional attack and quickly defeated the Georgian opposition. The Russians utilized conventional combined arms operations consisting of armor, mechanized and light infantry, tube and rocket artillery, and close air support to overwhelm the Georgian military.¹⁸ Although the Russians conducted a successful campaign and overwhelmed the Georgian military, the military did not perform well. Command and control issues, ground-air coordination, aging equipment, and intelligence failures marred their performance. Shortly after the conclusion of hostilities the political leadership of Russia announced a major military reform program.¹⁹ Implications of the conflict regarding a future

¹⁷ Carlos Caballero Jurado, *The Condor Legion, German Troops in the Spanish Civil War* (New York: Osprey Publishing, 2006) 7-11.

¹⁸ Roger N. Mc Dermott, “Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces and the Georgian War,” *Parameters*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1 (Spring 2009) 65-66.

¹⁹ Ibid., 69-73.

training concept are twofold. As the Army focuses on the counterinsurgency conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, a conventional threat exists and the Army must be capable of countering that threat. Secondly, the conflict indicates the complexity of conventional operations and the training required to conduct successful operations.

Another relevant conflict occurred between the Israelis and Hezbollah in their 2006 war. During the war, Hezbollah used a combination of conventional and asymmetric warfare to effectively defeat the Israeli ground offensive into Southern Lebanon. Prior to the conflict, the Israeli army concentrated their training on counterinsurgency operations and did not adapt to the combined conventional and asymmetric threat presented by the Hezbollah fighters in the defense. The war highlighted deficiencies in Israeli Defense Forces leadership, doctrine, training, and equipment. Equally important is Hezbollah's ability to formulate and execute a successful defense against Israel's Defense Forces.²⁰

Just as the Spanish Civil War contained elements of the type of fighting that would occur in World War II, the conflicts discussed above require analysis for implications for future operations and training. The Russian-Georgian conflict shows conventional operations are still possible. With most the world nations having conventional forces, those operations are still applicable for future operations. The Israeli and Hezbollah War in 2006 shows the consequences of training for one type of operation and having to conduct a different mission type. The Israelis failed to adapt to the conflict they encountered and did not perform well. The other point from the conflict was the asymmetrical type of defense Hezbollah successfully used against the Israeli

²⁰ Matt M. Matthews. *We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War*, The Long War Series Occasional Paper #26 (Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008) 2-3.

forces. The combination of a conventional defense integrated with irregular tactics repeatedly foiled Israeli attacks and the Israelis were unable to gain a decisive outcome with Hezbollah.

Thus far in this analysis of the current operational environment, this section examined the present operations of the Army and their effects on the Army, opinions regarding the attributes required for success for future operations, and recent international military actions. Another component affecting current operations is the Army's training doctrine.

Current Training Doctrine

Utilizing insight from the national strategy documents, current operations, and the projected operational environment, the Army published a newer version of Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*, in February 2008. The manual translates the operational requirements of the Army into the concept of Full Spectrum Operations. According to *Field Manual 3-0*, full spectrum operations are operations in which "Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results."²¹ The concept of full spectrum operations requires the Army to be able to conduct fundamentally different operations, often simultaneously. Full spectrum operations require the Army to be proficient at major combat operations, irregular warfare, civil support, and operations that fall in between each of these. Significant to this concept is that each element within full spectrum operations requires resources and time to train to train to full proficiency.

²¹ United States, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 3-0 Operations*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2008), 3-1.

A compliment to *Field Manual 3-0* is the U. S. Army cornerstone training doctrine, Field Manual 7-0, *Training For Full Spectrum Operations*. The Army published both simultaneously. The authors of *Field Manual 3-0* reviewed the training manual as it was being drafted to ensure both manuals complimented each other.²² *Field Manual 7-0* is the doctrinal foundation for training United States Army forces. The manual compliments the Army's Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* by incorporating the operational concepts of full spectrum operations. *Field Manual 7-0* also addresses and defines the impact of full spectrum operations on unit training, principles of training, the Army training system, and Army training management.

Field Manual 7-0 introduces concepts designed to train modular units in full spectrum operations. Full spectrum operation include offense, defense, stability, and a variable mix of all three. Influencing full spectrum operations is a complex strategic landscape, traditional threats, irregular threats, catastrophic threats, disruptive threats, and the unknown nature of future conflicts. The manual also address the increased demands on leaders derived from full spectrum operations, stating that leaders require intellect, agility, adaptability, and a high level of competence.²³

The manual discusses multiple key concepts such as the principles of training, the Army training system, Army training management, and the importance of leadership. Training for full spectrum operations places increased demands on leaders and requires intellect, agility, adaptability and a high level of competence. The principles of training provide a base for assisting

²² Dennis Tighe, Information Paper: Field Manual 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations, 2008 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Army Combined Arms Center- Training, 16 December 2008) 1.

²³ United States Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Field Manual 7-0, *Training For Full Spectrum Operations*, iii.

leaders in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing training. The Army training system has two components: training and education. The two components are exercised in three overlapping domains: institutional, operational, and self-development with leader training incorporated throughout the process. The Army training management section emphasizes the role of the Army Force Generation process, modularization's impact on training, and more importantly, the use of the Mission Essential Task List system with its three subsets: Core Mission Essential Task List, Joint Mission Essential Task List, and Directed Mission Essential Task List.

A major effect of the current training field manual which impacts future training is the increased demands on leaders. *Field Manual 7-0* states, “The art of command takes on even greater significance in today’s operational environments.”²⁴ The demands are not just placed on the officers, but noncommissioned officers as well. To meet the requirements to operate in multiple types of conflicts in a complex operating environment, leaders must be competent across the spectrum of conflict. It also requires a leader development program which is able to prepare a leader for uncertainty and complexity.

The manual further states, “A commander’s fundamental challenge is conducting training that develops proficiency in all elements of full spectrum operations.”²⁵ Before the introduction of full spectrum operations and the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, United States Army units had a hard enough time training for major combat operations. Units had varying degrees of success at the National Training Center focusing solely on offensive and defensive tasks. The additional tasks generated by full spectrum operations leave even less time to develop

²⁴ United States Department of Defense, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 7-0, Training For Full Spectrum Operations*, 1-6.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 1-7

proficiency. Efficiency, proficiency, and competence occurs with specialization but the Army does not have the resources, personnel, equipment, or funding to specialize. Combined with the lack of time and the focus on current operations, the requirements for preparedness across the full spectrum of operations are proving too great.

Throughout its text, *Field Manual 7-0* places responsibility for training on unit leaders and requires them to have agility. Leaders are solely responsible for training their units to succeed in a complex operating environment while engaged in persistent conflict. This persistent conflict produces constraints on time, personnel, material, and support. Adding to the challenges facing leaders in training their units is modularity. Due to modularity, soldiers and leaders require a wider base of knowledge because units are no longer specialized as in the old division/corps structure.²⁶

Principles of Training

Field Manual 7-0, *Training For Full Spectrum Operations*, introduced seven principles of training. The principles of training are: 1) commanders and other leaders are responsible for training; 2) noncommissioned officers train individuals, crews, and small teams; 3) train as you will fight; 4) train to standard; 5) train to sustain; 6) conduct multiechelon and concurrent training; and 7) train to develop agile leaders and organizations.²⁷ Four of the principles- train to standard, conduct multiechelon and concurrent training, noncommissioned officers train individuals, crews, and small teams, and train to sustain- are foundational principles and concrete. The other three

²⁶ United States Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Field Manual 7-0, *Training For Full Spectrum Operations*, 1-1 - 1-9.

²⁷Ibid., 2-1.

principles have implications beyond being foundational principles and affect future training concepts for the Army.

The first principle of training, commanders and other leaders are responsible for training, has additional requirements. The manual states that commanders are the unit's primary training managers and trainers who train their direct subordinate units and guide and evaluate training two echelons down. It states leaders must place a high priority on training and train for mission success while avoiding trying to do too much. Additionally commanders have the responsibility of developing leaders within their unit and rewarding initiative and innovation.²⁸ In preparing for the future conflict the leadership, who is responsible for training, must be versed and subject matter experts on the task they are training in order to effectively train their organizations. No one can be an expert on every single task across the spectrum of conflict, but they can be experts in a core set of tasks and skills on which they can train their unit to adapt to complex environments.

Another principle of training which requires additional exploration is 'train as you fight.' The manual states 'fight' includes lethal and non-lethal skills and that units must train for full spectrum operations and quick transitions between missions. Units must train the fundamentals first, combined arms operations, and train for complex and ambiguous situations.²⁹ By training core tasks and developing the intangible skills which allow units to adapt to complex and varying missions, the Army can still train as it fights and prepare for future operations.

'Train to develop agile leaders and organizations' is the most important principle and will allow the Army to adapt to the future operating environment discussed above. Leaders must learn

²⁸ United States Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Field Manual 7-0, *Training For Full Spectrum Operations*, 2-2.

²⁹ Ibid., 2-5

the art and science of battle command and then execute battle command in operations. Leaders must be educated to think and, along with their units, be able to adapt to changing mission roles and responsibilities.³⁰

Army Training System

Besides providing principles of training, Field Manual 7-0, *Training For Full Spectrum Operations*, also discusses the Army Training System. The Army Training System is the process in which the Army prepares to successfully conduct full spectrum operations. Its foundation is discipline, the principles and tenets previously discussed, and training support. The two components of the system are training and education. Training is exemplified by “what to do” and education is characterized by “how to think.” The components are exercised in three overlapping domains: institutional, operational, and self-development. Leader development is integrated into the system with the purpose of having competent and confident leaders grounded in Army values and agile.³¹

The institutional training domain consists of the institutional training and education system of initial entry training and subsequent military education. Its four major components include support to the field, initial military training, professional military education and functional training. The operational training domain consists of training that units conduct during unit training, major training events such as a maneuver combat training center rotation, and operational missions. The last training domain is self-development. Self-development training is the activities an individual pursue to increase their knowledge base, support and maintain the

³⁰ United States Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Field Manual 7-0, *Training For Full Spectrum Operations*, 2-11.

³¹ Ibid., 3-1 – 3-3.

knowledge gained in the institutional and operational domains, and further develop their personal competence.³²

Army Training Management

As discussed earlier, Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* is the doctrine of how the Army will conduct operations in order to accomplish the tasks given by the national command authority. Those tasks are derived from the current operational environment, anticipation of the future operational environment, and from the national strategy documents. *Field Manual 7-0* is the Army's doctrine on how it will train for the missions the Army has to accomplish. Understanding the Army's process for how it currently manages training is essential in developing a future training concept. The last chapter of *Field Manual 7-0* discusses Army Training Management. "Army training management is the process used by Army leaders to identify training requirements and subsequently plan, prepare, execute and assess training."³³ Modularization of units, Army Force Generation, the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and full spectrum operations influence the Army's training management.

One of the most important factors for training management is the Army Force Generation process, or ARFORGEN. ARFORGEN is a three phase process in which the Army reconstitutes, trains, and deploys units. ARFORGEN consists of a reset phase when units redeploy from operations or deployment window and begins to regenerate combat power. During this phase, the unit conducts personnel turnover and equipment refurbishment. Upon gaining sufficient combat power, units begin the second phase of ARFORGEN which is the train/ready phase. During this

³² United States Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Field Manual 7-0, *Training For Full Spectrum Operations*, 3-4 – 3-10.

³³ Ibid., 4-1.

phase units begin to conduct the majority of collective level training in preparation for deployment or assigned task. The final phase of ARFORGEN is the available phase in which units deploy to a theater or are available for other operations.³⁴ ARFORGEN attempts to bring predictability and organization for units deploying. Currently, the demand for units deriving from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan prevent the model from working.

Modularization is an integral factor in the Army's training management process and has changed training relationships and responsibilities. Modularization reorganized the Army from division-centric units into agile, expeditionary brigade-sized organizations. This shift requires brigade commanders to train organic units that are outside their branch. An example is that an infantry brigade commander is responsible for ensuring the artillery battalion organic to his brigade is trained as well as all other assigned battalions.³⁵

Another important section in *Field Manual 7-0* is the section explaining the Mission Essential Task List (METL). A METL is a compilation of mission essential tasks that an organization must perform successfully to accomplish its doctrinal or directed mission. A unit cannot train on every task required in full spectrum operations and METLs focus unit training. There are three types of METL. They are the Joint Mission-Essential Task List (JMETL), the Core Mission-Essential Task List (CMETL), and the Directed Mission-Essential Task List (DMETL). The JMETL is derived from the Department of Defense Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). The CMETL is based on the unit's authorization document and is standardized across the Army for that particular unit. Finally, the DMETL is derived by the commander and based upon a

³⁴ United States Department of Defense, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 7-0, Training For Full Spectrum Operations*, 4-1 – 4-2.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 4-2.

directed mission. Units train one Mission Essential Task List based on guidance given to the unit by Army headquarters.³⁶

The Core Mission-Essential Task List is composed of two subcomponents: core capability mission essential tasks and general mission tasks. Core capability tasks are as described above, but a general mission essential task is a task that all units must accomplish without regard to the type of unit. An example of a general mission essential task is “Conduct Command and Control.” A subcomponent to both core capability and general mission essential tasks are task groups. Task groups are sets of collective tasks which must be accomplished to succeed at the mission-essential task. Supporting the collective tasks are sets of individual and leader tasks which must be accomplished to be successful at the collective task.³⁷

The Army assigns standardized CMETL tasks to units. The CMETL tasks span full spectrum operations, but commanders decide which tasks to train due to limited time, resources, priorities and other constraints. The foundation of the METL system is that it allows commanders to focus training on tasks which, through subordinate commander to higher-level commander discourse, are deemed essential to accomplishing their mission.³⁸

When the Army assigns a directed mission to a unit, commanders develop a DMETL. The DMETL is a list of tasks that a unit must perform to accomplish its directed mission. The commander formulates the DMETL from the directed mission, higher commander’s guidance and his and his staff’s mission analysis. The mission analysis takes into account multiple variables. These variables include the unit’s CMETL, the anticipated operational environment, external

³⁶ United States Department of Defense, Department of the Army, Field Manual 7-0, *Training For Full Spectrum Operations* , 4-5 – 4-13.

³⁷ Ibid., 4-9.

³⁸ Ibid., 4-8.

guidance, doctrine and other publications, operational plans/orders, and training and leader development guidance. Once the commander has generated his DMETL, the list must be approved by the higher headquarters.³⁹

The last section of *Field Manual 7-0* discusses the Army training management model. At the core of the training management model is the organization's METL in which units plan, prepare, and execute training. From that process feedback is acquired in which the commander and staff assess the training. The process is a top-down/bottom-up approach to training. The last section of the chapter further defines and elaborates on each component of the training management model.⁴⁰

What the Army's doctrine on the training management system essentially means that, "Army units must have the capability to train on stability tasks, such as 'providing essential services' and 'support to economic and infrastructure development,' while sustaining proficiency in offensive and defensive operations."⁴¹ The capability is derived from the Army training management system which is the process used by Army leaders to identify training requirements and subsequently plan, prepare, execute, and assess training. Army force generation and modularization are integral effects on the training management system. The affects of the current ARFORGEN process is that it greatly limits the time available to train. Modularization's primary impact on training is that units are no longer a homogenous unit, but are now permanently task organized with multiple types of units under a single command. The effect is that it dilutes the expertise and knowledge base of a particular unit, thus degrading training.

³⁹ United States Department of Defense, Department of the Army, *Field Manual 7-0, Training For Full Spectrum Operations*, 4-11 – 4-13.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 4-14 – 4-40.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 1-8.

Current Operational Environment Summary

The current operations of the Army probably have the most impact on the future training of the force. The Army is currently focused on counterinsurgency operations with little training being conducted on conventional operations. An example of the dangers of being out of balance is the experience of the Israeli Defense Force before their conflict with Hezbollah in 2006. The Israeli Defense Force focused solely on the irregular warfare on the Lebanese border before the war and performed poorly in conventional operations.

One of the most important effects of the current operational environment is the lack of time available to train forces. Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are consuming Army ground forces with the already short time to train being spent on preparation for deployment. The Army Force Generation ratio of one year deployed and two years at home station has never been achieved. The requirements in theater and the lack of units available cause the ratio to be one year deployed and only one year at home station.⁴²

The current operational environment also affects future training through finite resources. Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and against global terrorism are priorities for personnel, equipment, funding, and other resources. Reduced personnel allocated to training centers, units leaving equipment in theater, and other constraints not only affect today's training, but tomorrow's as well.

The last effect of the current operational environment on the future training of the Army is the erosion of conventional operations knowledge in the leader base of the Army. For officers who joined the Army after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in September 2001, the

⁴² Timothy Chess, "Adapt and Overcome: MTTs Meet Demands of Operational Units," (*Infantry Magazine*, September – October 2008) 17.

only operations they have trained on and conducted have been counterinsurgency operations.

Although they have been taught Army doctrine and conventional operations in the institutional domain of training, they have not been able to apply it in training or operationally while deployed. Their concentration for eight years has been on counterinsurgency and stability operations.⁴³

In light of these challenges, this section proposed the future training concept of the Army should develop intangible skills which facilitate adaptability. Adaptability is required due to the current concentration on counterinsurgency and stability operations. That single focus is contrary to the Army's training requirement for full spectrum operations. It is also counter to the stated Army mission guidance in the national strategy documents which state the Army must be prepared for a wide range of contingencies. The following section will review the national strategy documents to further develop the Army's need to be prepared for multiple missions and types of operations.

Army Mission Guidance

The second task in developing the future training concept of the Army is to understand what requirements are given to the Army by the Department of Defense and the Congress of the United States. Those requirements are found in national security documents published by the President of the United States in the National Security Strategy, the Department of Defense in the National Defense Strategy, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the National Military Strategy and Title 10, United States Code, Section 3062 (a)..

⁴³ Gian P. Gentile, "Let's Build an Army to Win All Wars," *Joint Forces Quarterly* no. 52 (1st Quarter 2009) 27-33.

Title 10

Underlying all of the requirements is the fundamental mission of the Army which is defined in Title 10, United States Code, Section 3062 (a). Title 10 states “It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with other armed forces, of- 1) preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense of the United States, the territories, the Commonwealths, and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States; 2) supporting national policies; 3) implementing national objectives and; 4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.⁴⁴

Under Title 10 Congress further establishes the roles, responsibilities, and functions of the Army. The Army is to organize, equip, and train forces for combat operations on land, be capable of conducting air and missile defense, space operations, and joint amphibious and airborne operations. Additionally the Army is required to conduct other civil programs prescribed by law, provide logistic support to the other services in a theater of operations, and other responsibilities such as disaster assistance, land transportation, bulk petroleum management, and force protection.⁴⁵

The Title 10 roles responsibilities, and functions assigned to the Army are statutory obligations the Army is required to accomplish. The requirements are broad in nature such as implementing national objectives, but also restrictive such as being tasked to “provide logistic and other executive agent functions to enable other services to accomplish their missions.”

⁴⁴ United States Department of the Army. *Field Manual 1, The Army*. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army (December 2008) 2-7 – 2-8.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 2-6 – 2-8.

Additionally, the executive branch of the government, primarily through the national security documents, assign additional responsibilities and missions to the Army.

2006 National Security Strategy

The *2006 National Security Strategy* is the base document from which the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy are written. The *2006 National Security Strategy* states our national security is founded on two pillars: the promotion of freedom, justice, and human dignity; and confronting our challenges through leadership of the world's democracies. Upon those pillars rest nine tasks which form the backbone of our national security strategy. Of those nine tasks, six directly impact the Army.⁴⁶

Those requirements emphasize alliances and cooperation with other nations to defeat global terrorism, prevent terrorist attacks, and to defuse regional conflicts. The requirements also include prevent the threat of weapons of mass destruction against the United States and partner nations, participation in globalization and facilitate global development. Of note with facilitating global development is “opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy.” The last requirement focuses on the transformation of national security institutions in order to accomplish future tasks in an ever changing international environment.⁴⁷

The requirements listed in the *2006 National Security Strategy* are based on the presumption that our domestic liberties are becoming more dependent on the formation of liberty abroad, and that we have to engage internationally to secure the United States. Implications of the *National Security Strategy* on the Army are wide ranging. The Army will undergo transformation,

⁴⁶ White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2006*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/> (accessed 3 August 2009) 1.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 2.

conduct a continuous war against terrorism, project forces overseas, and conduct non-traditional missions such as building democracy abroad simultaneously.⁴⁸ George W. Bush wrote “We must maintain a military without peer – yet our strength is not founded on force of arms alone.”⁴⁹ The *2006 National Security Strategy* along with the President’s statement greatly impact the future training of the Army.

The requirements from the national strategy documents are the backbone for future training. They support the continuing war on terrorism and our commitment toward engagement abroad to confront challenges to our domestic liberty. The *2006 National Security Strategy*’s formation of liberty abroad indicate the Army might be called upon to conduct non-traditional missions such as disaster relief, assisting the State Department in building democracy, and other stability activities. The documents maintain traditional warfighting functions of being able to win high intensity conflicts, but the emphasis is more on the asymmetrical missions such as counterterrorism, foreign internal defense, and stability operations.

2008 National Defense Strategy

Based on the *2006 National Security Strategy* the Department of Defense published the *2008 National Defense Strategy*. The *Defense Strategy* states that the security of the United States is largely dependent on international security, and focuses on building the capacity of select countries to resist internal and external threats. By strengthening selected countries, the international system increases its capability to counter rogue states and regional hegemons. With the goal of providing enduring security for the nation, the *2008 National Defense Strategy* has

⁴⁸ White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2006*, 3.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, ii.

five objectives, all impacting Army missions. These objectives are: defend the homeland; win the long war; promote security; deter conflict; and win our nation's wars.⁵⁰

Defending the homeland is an overarching responsibility for the Department of Defense. Increased openness from globalization and the capability of catastrophic violence from small groups or individuals requires a layered defense. Department of Defense plays a significant role in partnership with the Department of Homeland Security and other national agencies in providing this defense. This also includes support to the Department of Homeland Security and civil authorities in times of national emergencies.

The next objective in the *2008 National Defense Strategy* is winning the long war against violent extremism. The strategy states this is the primary mission for the Department of Defense in the foreseeable future and will be fought in a series of campaigns lasting years. Integral to the strategy are global partnerships, building the ability of nations to resist internal and external extremists, and the use of all national elements of power requiring interagency cooperation.⁵¹

Another objective of the *2008 National Defense Strategy* is to promote security, which builds upon the statement that the security of the United States is largely dependent on international security. Promoting security entails building the strength of global partners, deny safe-havens for extremist groups, and prevent local and regional conflicts from spreading. This also entails discourse with China and Russia. The strategy pursues strategic dialogue with China, while at the same time hedging against Chinese threats. Increased cooperation while dissuading

⁵⁰ United States Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy, 2008*, (Washington, DC: 2008) 1-6.

⁵¹ Ibid., 6-9.

the Russian government from adverse policies marks the strategy for promoting security with Russia.⁵²

The *2008 National Defense Strategy* also seeks to deter conflict through tailored deterrence according to the situation and developing new capabilities and methods to counter threats. Deterrence over a wide range of threats not only means dissuading attacks, but also improving our ability to withstand attack and recover, thus showing the futility of attacks against the nation. This means that deterrence is increasingly dependent on interagency cooperation.⁵³

The last objective of the *2008 National Defense Strategy* is to win our nation's wars. The Department of Defense must be able to engage and defeat enemies who have a broad range and combination of capabilities such as conventional, irregular, kinetic, and non-kinetic. Although the focus is currently on irregular warfare, the nation's armed forces must maintain the capabilities to defeat enemies with conventional threats, to include nuclear armed states.⁵⁴

The *2008 National Defense Strategy* states that the Department of Defense will achieve its objectives through five methods. The first method is shaping the choices of key states. Through deterrence, cooperation with our allies and friends, and engagement with China and Russia, the United States can shape the behavior, choices, and actions of states, rogue nations, and actors in the international system. The next method is preventing adversaries from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction. Reducing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, anticipating and countering threats, and taking action to secure weapons when a state loses control of their weapons of mass destruction are integral to the achievement of the defense

⁵² United States Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy, 2008*, 9-11.

⁵³ Ibid., 11-12.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 13.

strategy objectives. The third method for achieving the defense objectives is strengthening and expanding alliances and partnerships. The key to the United States success in securing itself is through the use of alliances and partnerships. The fourth method is securing United States strategic access and retaining freedom of action. Global prosperity and security depends on the free flow of traffic and goods around the world including access to natural resources and energy reserves. The final method of achieving the defense strategy objectives is to integrate and unify our efforts. The Department of Defense must not only integrate and unify efforts across the military branches, but across the departments of the government as well. In order to meet the future security challenges of the United States, a coordinated whole-of-government approach is necessary for success.⁵⁵

The *2008 National Defense Strategy* provides the Army more focus on future expectations and missions. Its objectives of defending the homeland, winning the long war, promoting security, deterring conflict, and winning our nation's wars emphasizes the national commitment to success in the current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and future operations directed toward terrorist elements. It also emphasizes the necessity of the Army to adapt to future conflicts.

2004 National Military Strategy

As of October 2009, a new *National Military Strategy* has not yet been published since the *2008 National Defense Strategy*. Therefore the *2004 National Military Strategy* is still applicable to the training strategies of the United States Army. The *National Military Strategy* follows the goals and objectives found in the *National Security Strategy* and implements the

⁵⁵ United States Department of Defense, *The National Defense Strategy, 2008*, 13-20.

National Defense Strategy. “The *National Military Strategy* provides focus for military activities by defining a set of interrelated military objectives from which the service chiefs and combatant commander identify desired capabilities and against which CJCS assesses risk.”⁵⁶

The *2004 National Military Strategy* begins to refine the goals and expectations for military units. The strategy states strategic principles for the Armed Forces are agility, decisiveness, and integration. Military units must be agile to cope with uncertainty, decisive in order to overcome situations they face, and be able to integrate with a wide range of military, civilian, non-governmental, and interagency entities.⁵⁷

Objectives for the military in support of the National Security Strategy are: protect the United States against external attacks and aggression; prevent conflict and surprise attack; and prevail against adversaries. It further states four joint operating concepts in support of those objectives guide planning and execution. Those four joint operating concepts are homeland security, stability operations, strategic deterrence, and major combat operations.⁵⁸

The *National Military Strategy* also defines desired attributes of the force which focus the force on how to defeat the enemy using a broad spectrum of threat capabilities instead of who the force is fighting. The attributes include units are fully integrated, meaning that units can easily function across service boundaries; expeditionary, meaning units are easily deployable and sustainable overseas; and networked, which links the force in time and purpose. Additional attributes include decentralized, giving lower level units autonomy to conduct operations based on task, purpose, endstate, and most importantly, freedom to make decisions on the battlefield;

⁵⁶ Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, A Strategy for Today: A Vision for Tomorrow*, (Washington, DC: 2004) viii.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 7-8.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 9-14.

adaptability, meaning being able to succeed in the complex nature of the situations facing the military; and decision superiority, meaning forces have information to make the correct decisions faster than an enemy. Underlying all the attributes is lethality, the ability to destroy an adversary.⁵⁹

The final concept applicable to future Army training in the *2004 National Military Strategy* is Full Spectrum Dominance. “Full Spectrum Dominance is the ability to control any situation or defeat any adversary across the range of military operations.” Full Spectrum Dominance focus the military on transformation, interagency cooperation, partnerships with allies, operating as a joint force, and a capabilities approach toward operations.⁶⁰

The *2004 National Military Strategy* gives greater focus for future training. Homeland security, stability operations, strategic deterrence, and major combat operations all have major training requirements for the Army. The seven attributes required by the military also impact how the Army trains for the next operation. The military strategy states forces must be integrated, expeditionary, networked, decentralized, adaptable, have decision superiority, and lethal. Those concepts guide the character of training.

The section above shows that the Title 10 statutory obligations and the national strategic documents with their guiding principles and objectives are the primary driving force for Army training. Title 10’s roles, responsibilities, and functions of the Army provide a broad but also restrictive requirements the future training concept must account for. The nested concepts starting with the President’s *2006 National Security Strategy* provide the basis for possible missions and

⁵⁹ Department of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America, A Strategy for Today: A Vision for Tomorrow*, 15-16

⁶⁰ Ibid., 23

expectations of the force for the future. The national security strategy statements that our domestic liberties are becoming more dependent on formation liberty abroad, opening societies, and building democracies, which indicate increased activities abroad to facilitate our security. Combined with defusing regional conflicts and defeating global terrorism the implications to the future training of the army are multifaceted. The implications include future expeditionary type operations, major combat operations, stability operations, counterinsurgency operations, and other non-conventional operations for the Army.

Up to this point, the study has defined the current operational environment, and reviewed the missions and tasks for the Army as stated in the national security documents. Building on the current operational environment, the missions and tasks given to the Army, a review of the current doctrine will allow framing of three different training concepts presented by three military and civilian arguments.

Military and Civilian Opinions

With regards to the current operational environment and in light of requirements for the Army in the national strategy documents, three common arguments are addressed in military circles regarding the direction the Army needs to focus on with respect to training. The first argument is that the Army must both train for the current fight but remain focused on full spectrum operations to include conventional operations. The second argument states that the Army must focus training on the current fight with specialized counterinsurgency training and that while future operations are important, the current fight is the main focus. The last perspective, which is not as publicly voiced, is that the Army must find basic competencies which span the current fight and possible future operations and focus training on those few mission essential tasks or in other words, core competencies.

Colonel Gian Gentile, the Army officer in charge of West Point's Department of History's Military History Division, argues that today's doctrine is focused on non-war fighting

skills to the detriment of kinetic operations. The doctrine emphasizes counterinsurgency and nation building with the major focus being security of a nation's population and the formation of a stable government. He states that the Army is fundamentally shifting organizational principles from being a war fighting institution to a counterinsurgency force that will ultimately risk the future security of the United States. According to Gentile, with the shift in focus, Army intellectuals are becoming short sighted and overly concerned with the lessons learned in the Middle East, overlooking the experiences of Israel against Hezbollah in 2006, the Russian invasion of Georgia, and the conventional capabilities of nations such as Iran and North Korea. He also warns against the effects of atrophy in conventional fighting skills. The Army cannot quickly adapt from being a counterinsurgency force to a conventional fighting army.⁶¹

John A. Nagl, a prominent defense analyst, provides another view regarding a training philosophy for the Army. He states the current war is the most important endeavor for the US Army and future operations are secondary. A review of the history of United States military operations indicate the American military has been more often engaged by stability and nonconventional operations than conventional operations. He states the future will be more of the same. Lack of adaptation is another area Nagl focuses on, he states the Army did not adapt to the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan due to a lack of changing focus from conventional fighting conventions to counterinsurgency. Nagl argues that future American enemies are less likely to fight conventional operations after the victories in Desert Storm and initial operations in Iraq. In

⁶¹ Gian P. Gentile, "Let's Build an Army to Win All Wars," 27-33.

the future, our adversaries will adapt the lessons from the insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan to fight the United States.⁶²

Another opinion is expressed by Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter W. Chiarelli. He bases his opinion on a statement in FM 7-0 which states, “Good leaders understand that they cannot train on everything; therefore, they focus on training the most important tasks. Leaders do not accept substandard performance in order to complete all the tasks on the training schedule. Training a few tasks to standard is preferable to training more tasks below the standard.”⁶³ General Chiarelli states that training should focus on a few mission essential battle tasks in which units can adapt and adjust to a complex situation. The Army cannot train on all of its assigned tasks and missions so it has to focus on key tasks. Leaders using the focused mission essential tasks, must be able to train their formations to become versatile and agile because the current lack of time in the ARFORGEN cycle. He also states as the demands from the current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan lessen, the Army should resist adding additional training requirements at the expense of training the focused mission essential tasks.⁶⁴

The three opinions discussed above presented three different approaches to future training for the Army. One expressed that the Army must focus on the current fight, another stated training must be balanced to cover the full spectrum of operations, and the last opinion stated that units should train on a few mission essential tasks which are applicable across the range of operations. Colonel Gentile’s argument to train for full spectrum operations and John

⁶² John A. Nagl, “Let’s Win the Wars We’re In.” *Joint Forces Quarterly* no. 52 (1st Quarter 2009) 20-26.

⁶³ Peter W. Chiarelli, “Training Full Spectrum- Less is More By: GEN Peter W. Chiarelli, VCSA.” Combined Arms Center Blog, <http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/blog/blogs/guestblog/archive/2009/06/30/> accessed 28 August 2009, 1.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 2-4.

Nagl's stance to train for the current fight, expose gaps in our current training doctrine. FM 7-0 states "a balanced approach to the types of tasks to be trained is essential to readiness for full spectrum operations," but in the realities of the current operational environment with a one-to-one dwell time for units balance is unachievable.⁶⁵ Units must prepare for operations they will conduct upon deployment which are currently is irregular in nature. Thus an unit's ability to conduct major combat operations or other operations along the spectrum of conflict erode. The amount of time to train and the necessity to prepare Soldiers for the conflict they will experience does not allow for balance.

Bridging this gap is General Chiarelli's argument to train on core tasks which span the spectrum of conflict and training leaders, units, and soldiers who can adapt those tasks across the spectrum of conflict. Complex problems cannot be solved without a focused, methodical approach. The Army cannot train for every mission and contingency. The current operations the Army is engaged in combined with the Army force generation model do not allow sufficient time to train. Even if the operational tempo allowed two years of training before being deployed, units would not be able to train every task to standard across the spectrum of conflict. Therefore, the Army must focus on core tasks and the skills necessary to adapt those tasks to varied and complex problems. General Chiarelli's opinion about focusing on core tasks is the approach the Army should take with regards to future training concepts.

A Core Competency Task List is a list of tasks a unit can train on which provides the baseline of training on which it can adapt across the spectrum of conflict. It comprises the fundamental tasks units must perform during operations to ensure success. The broad spectrum of

⁶⁵ United States Department of the Army, *Field Manual 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations*, 1-6.

operations the Army must be ready to conduct presents challenges in creating a core competency list from which units are able to adapt to different types of missions. Those challenges are less difficult if an analysis of basic skills is done at the soldier and unit level.

At the unit level, the core competencies are derived from the tasks common across the spectrum of operations and key tasks particular to a type of operation. Examples of common tasks spanning the spectrum of conflict are command and control at all levels, movement to contact, and react to contact. Major combat operations use defensive principles as well as platoon and company patrol bases in Iraq and Afghanistan. Other attributes, such as General Casey's stated attribute of lethality, are inherently trained through the core competency list.

Complimenting the core competency task list are the intangibles which arguably are the most important attributes of a unit. Integral in successfully executing a core competency task are the underlying principles of discipline, adaptability, initiative, teamwork, cohesion, and the other factors Van Creveld, Mansoor, and Marshall discussed. In support of his argument, General Chiarelli writes about an armor platoon he supervised which competed in the Canadian Army Trophy competition. During their train-up, the platoon focused on the competition and little else. The platoon won the completion and shortly afterwards deploys to NTC. With limited specific training for the rotation the platoon performed astonishing well.⁶⁶ The reason why they did is that they possessed the intangibles and were able to adapt to the specifics of NTC. They were able to apply core skills and use discipline, teamwork, and mastery of basic skills which they developed during the training for the Canadian Army Trophy completion to succeed at NTC. This concept

⁶⁶ Peter W. Chiarelli, "Training Full Spectrum- Less is More By: GEN Peter W. Chiarelli, VCSA.", 2.

can work for the Army but it requires leadership and a different training concept utilizing the core competency tasks.

Another component of a core competency task list is individual soldier training. Unit success is dependent on soldiers. Successful operations are conducted by soldiers who are competent, disciplined, adaptive, and confident. Core competency training must begin with every individual completely understanding their job. The emphasis of training is on basic soldiers skills such as marksmanship, equipment experts, medical, physical, maintenance, small unit tactics, and leadership.

Thus far this study has examined two areas impacting the future training of the Army and presented two concepts on how the Army can train for the next conflict. The first section reviewed the current operational environment of the Army and its impact on training. Based on this analysis, the future training concept must instill intangible skills within leaders, units, and soldiers which allow them to adapt to complex operations ranging the spectrum of operations.

The next section reviewed Army mission guidance derived from national strategic documents, and multiple opinions on how the Army should prepare for the next conflict. From the review of the Army mission guidance, the study presented the concept of core competency training that when combined with the intangible skills, will provide the Army with a baseline of tasks, skills, and attributes which will allow the Army to adapt to the next conflict or mission. The following section examines the affect of the future operational environment on training.

Future Operational Environment

Future Operational Environment- Factors, Trends, and Variables

The final influence affecting training concepts to prepare the Army for the next conflict is the future operational environment. The future operational environment consists of the factors affecting future operations and potential challenges and threats.

The future operating environment is a forward looking, historically based view of the world-wide environment and specific countries that can bring complexity to military operations internationally and at home. By understanding these future challenges, the military can anticipate how to mitigate and overcome the problems it faces while accomplishing future missions and tasks.

The United States Joint Forces Command Center for Joint Futures (J59) published the Joint Operating Environment in late 2008 and proposed ten factors which can influence the world's future security. The document proposes the importance of the trends is that “the value of the trends lies not in accurately predicting them, but in intuiting how they might combine in different ways to form more enduring contexts for future operations.”⁶⁷ These contexts for future operations will shape the way the Army trains and prepares for future conflicts and missions. The paragraphs below discuss the factors and their significance.

The first set of variables affecting the future operating environment is demographics, globalization, and economics. World demographics is the baseline trend impacting almost all of the other trends. The world's population is predicted to grow to eight billion people by 2030 with most of the growth in developing countries and India. Further complicating demographics is a decline in population among developed countries such as European countries, Russia, and Japan. The impacts of this are increased competition for resources, economic pressures stemming from inability to support growing populations, and an increase in unrest as expectations of the people

⁶⁷ Center for Joint Futures (J59), *The Joint Operating Environment (JOE)*. (Suffolk, VA. United States Joint Forces Command. 2008) 10.

are not met. Additionally the decline of population in developed countries influences the actions of the affected nations to place their militaries in harm's way.⁶⁸

Globalization and economic changes when combined with demographics have a large impact on the future operating environment. Thomas L. Friedman defines globalization as “the inexorable integration of markets, nation-states and technologies to a degree never witnessed before-in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations and nation-states to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before, and in a way that is enabling the world to reach into individuals, corporations and nation-states farther, faster, deeper, cheaper than ever before.”⁶⁹ This interdependence increases the livelihoods and cooperation of the international community but it also further separates underdeveloped countries from the rest of the world creating tensions. Economics affects the future operating environment through the global economy. Stability of nations, welfare of people, and the strategic options a country has is dependent on financial stability. Future economic changes create instability and a decrease in global security due to globalization. Economic pressures can cause nations to act irrationally thus increasing the likelihood of conflict.⁷⁰

The second set of issues affecting the future operating environment are resources: energy, food, and water. With the increased industrialization of China, India, and other emerging countries, combined with the increase in demand for energy from a growing world population, the world’s energy resources become increasingly important and a possible source of conflict. Equally important is the requirement to secure the transport of those resources across vulnerable

⁶⁸ Center for Joint Futures (J59), *The Joint Operating Environment (JOE)*, 10-13

⁶⁹ Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Anchor Books, 2000) 9.

⁷⁰ National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, November 2008) 6-13.

international chokepoints. Global food and water supply are other sources of future tensions which could affect the operating environment. The increase in the global population will place increased pressures on the food supply, but possible shortages of water are more of a problem. Water shortages caused by droughts and increased demand has the potential to destabilize regions and affect future operations. Migration away from drought stricken areas poses a destabilizing threat to countries which are already stressed by population and a lack of resources.⁷¹ This destabilization can trigger international humanitarian relief efforts and expeditions to quell conflict which threaten strategic locations. Robert Kaplan, an American journalist, states “Future wars will be those of communal survival, aggravated or, in many cases, caused by environmental scarcity.”⁷²

The third set of variables is climate change, natural disasters, and pandemics. Climate changes such as global warming and rising sea levels have uncertain consequences for future operations. The stressors placed on weak countries can destabilize governments causing strife and potentially destabilized regions. Natural disasters will continue to pose a threat globally. Earthquakes, hurricanes, and other deadly storms will affect military forces around the world and place heavy demands on affected countries. Possible pandemics such as the “Black Death” plague in the 14th century can have devastating effects on mankind and security. The threat of naturally occurring events and terrorist released pathogens will continue to impact the future operational environment.⁷³

⁷¹ Center for Joint Futures (J59), *The Joint Operating Environment (JOE)* 16-21.

⁷² Robert D. Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War* (New York: Random House, 2000) 49.

⁷³ National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World*, 40-51.

The last set of issues affecting the future operating environment is cyber and space. Information technology and the continuation of the technological revolution will greatly affect future operations. Countries and militaries are increasingly dependent on information and communication technology with that trend exponentially expanding in the future. Dependence on technology creates vulnerabilities not previously experienced. Disruption of computer networks, network attacks, and manipulation of information are just three of the future threats facing the military in the future.⁷⁴ In conjunction with the increased dependence on technology is the use of space-based platforms used for communications, navigation, surveillance and reconnaissance, and economic uses. Once the domain of a few countries, space is now accessible to most world nations and major corporations. This is due to an increase in launch capabilities and satellites worldwide. Technological advances in weaponry and the increased accessibility has made space another theater of operations, thus impacting the future operating environment.⁷⁵

These issues, variables, and trends affect the future training of the Army in both direct and indirect ways. The following examines the multiple effects of the issues and factors on the direction of training. The first effect is economic in nature. The Army is affected by economic downturns which change the allocation of resources to the Department of Defense. Prioritization and competition of resources is exasperated by tighter budgets, increase in fuel costs, funding for ongoing operations such as Iraq and Afghanistan, maintenance, and replacement of equipment from wear and tear caused by the operational tempo. Due to the increased demand on the budget, constraints on resources can affect the way the Army trains for the future. Regardless of the

⁷⁴ Paul S. Oh, “Future Strategic Environment in an Era of Persistent Conflict” *Military Review*, (July-August 2009) 74.

⁷⁵ Center for Joint Futures (J59), *The Joint Operating Environment (JOE)* 22-23.

budget, the nation will still expect the Army to accomplish assigned missions and operations. The second impact the variables have on training for the next conflict or operation is the possibility for increased deployments. Population growth causing conflict, struggle for control of natural resources, climate change causing instability, and natural disasters increase the possibility for the Army to deploy to protect the nation's interests. The third implication of the trends on future training is the possibility the Army will be called for natural disaster support such as the employment of forces in support of Hurricane Katrina relief efforts along the United States Gulf Coast in 2006. The last major effect on training from the factors is the increased worldwide use of technology and access to space increases the vulnerabilities to Army systems. As the Army becomes increasingly dependent on technology, it cannot lose the foundational training which those systems are built on. Reliance on technology without the understanding of the fundamental skills which the technology enhances increases vulnerabilities if the technology fails. An example of this is a unit being dependent on global positioning satellites for land navigation and not being able to navigate without the system.

Future Operating Environment- Potential Challenges and Threats

In addition to the trends influencing world security, the future operational environment includes potential challenges and threats. Samuel P. Huntington in his book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* writes, "The rivalry of the superpowers is replaced by the clash of civilizations."⁷⁶ The conventional powers are states with central institutions which will change over the course of time and adapt to the international environment.

⁷⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2003) 28.

The rise of non-state actors will complicate the affairs of nation-states. The balance of power between states will rise and fall, particularly with the rise of China. China is not the only rising power as Russia and India are also gaining power. Less influential countries are exerting regional power and building military forces such as Brazil, Egypt, Nigeria, and Vietnam. Potentially the rise in influence and military power of those nations could affect potential United States actions.⁷⁷

China's rise in power has great implications to the future operational environment. One writer states "China will almost become the diplomatic near-peer of the United States," thus complicating American international strategic engagements.⁷⁸ The Chinese economy is globally one of the strongest, if not the strongest, and it is fueling the nation's growing exertion of power throughout the world. The Chinese are methodically increasing their military strength and capabilities which is funded by its economic growth. Of particular note is their increase in naval spending and upgrades, and efforts to project forces. The economic growth is also fueling a growing need for energy resources. China's need for energy, coupled with other growing and developing nations, is creating increasing demand and competition which has potential security implications.⁷⁹

Russian rise in military spending and its assertion of power is another possible threat and challenge to United States regional interests. Russian influences in the Caucuses, Central Asia, and their relationship with China are all potential regional problems.⁸⁰ In addition to its large

⁷⁷ Center for Joint Futures (J59). *The Joint Operating Environment (JOE)* 24-26.

⁷⁸ Thomas P. M. Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: The Berkley Publishing Group, 2004) 381.

⁷⁹ Center for Joint Futures (J59). *The Joint Operating Environment (JOE)* 26-29.

⁸⁰ Colin S. Grey, "The 21st Century Security Environment and the Future of War" *Parameters*, 38:4, (Winter 2008-2009) 21.

nuclear arsenal, they also possess and manufacture sophisticated weaponry which poses challenges to the United States if the weaponry is exported or used in a regional conflict.⁸¹

The Pacific and Indian Ocean region is characterized by the challenges and threats posed from North Korea, the Indian-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir, and the fact that the Straits of Malacca are in the region. The Straits of Malacca are a strategic energy transshipment route and trade route for the global economy. The continuing threat from North Korea presents an ongoing challenge for the United States. North Korean capabilities range from conventional to unconventional forces equipped with possible nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Taiwan is also in this area and the threat from China is persistent.⁸²

Central and South America present a small but persistent challenge and threat. Challenges arise from a troublesome Venezuela, Cuba, Mexican internal strife, and drug cartels. Oil from Venezuela and Brazil increasingly make the region more strategically important.⁸³

Africa is characterized by its abundance of natural resources, increasing outside nation exploitation of those natural resources, weak and instable states, and conflict. Instability in most of Africa is the norm and humanitarian and genocidal incidents will most likely continue. Issues with access to natural resources will be of concern to global security and invite possible intervention.⁸⁴

The Middle East and Central Asia are currently home to two major theaters of operations for the United States and has varying levels of instability throughout the region. The region is

⁸¹ Center for Joint Futures (J59). *The Joint Operating Environment (JOE)* 28-29.

⁸² Ibid., 31-32.

⁸³ Ibid., 33-34.

⁸⁴ Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy*, 7-9.

besieged by religious, governmental, economic, and social conflict with no near term solution. The first and most complex source of conflict is the necessity of the governments in the region to balance the pressures of Islamic fundamentalism with the governing functions of the standing governments. The second and third major sources of conflict within the region are economic and social in nature. The dependence of the region on oil for income and few other sources of revenue create not only economic problems within the Middle East but social problems such as an out of balance division of wealth. The fourth major source of conflict within the region is its tenuous relationship with the West and the tensions between Islam and secular religions. Due to these destabilizing issues, the region will continue to consume the attention of the United States.⁸⁵

Other threats and challenges for the future include weak and failing states, threats of unconventional power, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, urbanization, and developing technology are all sources of concern for future operations. Weak and failing states create power vacuums and areas instability which affect the surrounding nations. The collapse of Somalia continues to have regional ramifications in Eastern Africa. Unconventional power utilized by groups such as Hezbollah, terrorist organizations, and criminal organizations can potentially challenge military operations. As discussed above, weapons of mass destruction and the continued development of technology are areas of concern for development of military training priorities. Finally, increased world urbanization exacerbates the complexity of the security trends mentioned in previous paragraphs and future military operations.⁸⁶

Combined with the missions and tasks from current operations and the guidance from the national strategic documents, the challenges and threats presented in the section above should

⁸⁵ Center for Joint Futures (J59). *The Joint Operating Environment (JOE)* 34-35.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 35-42.

provide direction on how the Army trains its forces. With challenges ranging from a resurgent China and Russia to radical Islamic terrorists, the Army potentially could face a wide range of adversaries in pursuit of national interests. The possible adversary capabilities run from conventional to unconventional with varying degrees of scope and size. The challenges and threats range internationally in different locations, climates, and population densities. The implications to training include being able to conduct operations in multiple types of geography, climate, and conditions against a host of different threats and capabilities.

The future operating environment impacts future training largely by adding complexity to future operations, increasing the probability of conflict, and creating more unknowns. The evolving threat tactics and actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, actions in the 2006 Israeli/Hezbollah conflict, and other conflicts are possible indicators of future conflicts. As possible indicators, lessons learned from these conflicts should be incorporated into future training concepts. One indicator is that concentrating on a single part of the spectrum of operations such as the Israeli concentration on irregular warfare before the 2006 conflict with Hezbollah leads to an erosion of conventional warfighting skills. Another indicator is having to adapt to conventional warfare and unconventional warfare which occur simultaneously in a conflict. These indicators show the future training concept must bridge the training gap along the spectrum of conflict. It also indicates the importance of adaptability and training the skills which facilitate adaptability.

Increased competition for resources, climate change, population growth, urbanization, and changes in demographics all add to the complexity and increased chances for conflict across a broad spectrum of locations, conditions, and intensities. The impacts on training is that the Army has to continue to train in a variety of locations, conditions, and maintain the knowledge base of how to operate in specific challenging conditions such as the desert, mountains, and jungle.

The United States not being the dominant international power is another possibility in the future operating environment. An emergent China with an economic decline in the United States

brings multiple challenges to the military and future training in the Army. Operating the Army in an increasingly economic constrained environment greatly affects training. Emergent threats challenge the Army to maintain the force structure, equipment, and training in order to defeat those threats if necessary.

The most important concept the future operational environment for the future operational concept of the Army is that success is dependent on leadership which is adaptable to complex and unknown environments. An example of the importance of leadership in the face of the unknown is how units innovated during the interwar years before the onset of World War II. The most important quality an organization must possess to innovate and evolve to meet future requirements on the battlefield is leadership. Not only must leadership support change, it must create an environment where past events are objectively analyzed and new ideas are encouraged and judged without bias.⁸⁷

Conclusion

The Army is at a crossroads regarding training for future operations. With limited time, resources, and the current high demands from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army must develop a training strategy which best prepares the force for the current fight and for the future. In order to understand how the Army should prepare for the next mission, this paper reviewed the major factors affecting the future training of the Army, presented civilian and military opinions on how the Army should train for future operations, and discussed possible future training concepts.

⁸⁷ Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, eds., *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*, 34-45.

The basic problem for the Army is how it can best train for future operations when it has a wide range of missions and a lack of time to train, is preoccupied with current operations, is facing a complex and ambiguous future operating environment, and has finite resources. Adding to the problem is a training doctrine which does not fully prepare the Army for future operations and fails to take into account the current operational environment.

To answer this problem, three major factors affecting future training were analyzed. The first major factor affecting training discussed was the current operational environment. Within the current operational environment the current operational deployments, two recent military conflicts, comments from the Chief of Staff of the Army, and current training doctrine from Army Field Manual 7-0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations* were reviewed. The assessment which resulted from that section was that future training of the Army must incorporate intangible skills into the training concept. Those intangible skills include discipline, initiative, problem solving, and critical thinking.

The next major factors affecting training evaluated were the current national strategy documents, military and civilian opinions regarding how the Army should train for the future, and analysis of *Field Manual 7-0*. From this discussion emerged the concept the Army must train core competency tasks and skills. When combined with intangible skills, this allows units to more readily adapt to a complex and unknown environment. Training the core competency skills allows units optimize time and focuses resources to best prepare for the future.

The last major factor affecting training assessed was the future operational environment. The discussion focused on the factors, variables, and trends affecting the next operational environment and possible threats to United States interests which would affect how the Army prepares for operations in that environment. This section also reviewed the principles of training from *Field Manual 7-0*, and the Army's Training System. The results from this analysis of the future operational environment was that the next training concept for the Army requires an emphasis on adaptive leadership.

This analysis of the three major factors affecting future training concepts for the Army established that the Army is facing a wide range of missions, has lack of time to train, is preoccupied with current operations, is facing a complex and ambiguous future operating environment, and finite resources. Due to these factors, the Army can best train for future operations by focusing on core tasks spanning the spectrum of conflict, developing discipline, initiative, problem solving and other intangible skills, and focusing on leader development which will allow leaders, units and soldiers to successfully adapt to a complex and unknown future and lead to success on the battlefield.

Recommendations

The first recommendation is that future training doctrine should incorporate core competency skills which span across the spectrum of operations and allow for leaders, units and soldiers to adapt to the situation they face. The mission requirements given to the Army from the nation, the demands on time and resources from the current operational environment, and the complexity and unknowns regarding the future operational environment requires a training program that best prepares the Army for the next mission or requirement. Core competency tasks will allow units to maximize training time and resources in training a base set of skills to an extremely high level of competency. Complementing the core competency task training is emphasis on the intangible skills such as discipline, initiative, critical thinking, and problem solving which allows leaders, units, and soldiers to adapt those core competency tasks and skills to a wide range of missions.

These intangible skills which facilitate adaptability such as discipline, initiative, problem solving, critical thinking, and basic skill mastery should be incorporated into the principles of training in Field Manual 7-0, *Training for Full Spectrum Operations*. When combined with the training of core competency tasks and skills, the intangibles will facilitate units mission

accomplishment in the face of complexity and the unknown. Development of these intangible skills rest on unit leaders and require leaders well versed in full spectrum military operations.

The third recommendation is to create centers of expertise regarding the spectrum of conflict. The centers would maintain the knowledge base and become the Army's experts on a particular type of conflict. A possible approach is to focus the National Training Center on major combat operations and the Joint Readiness Training Center on irregular warfare. While the center's focus is on a particular type of operation, their training should cover the spectrum of conflict during training events. The Soldiers in these centers would be the subject matter experts and be able to coach, mentor, and teach leaders and units as necessary. The Army already has organizations of this type such as the Mountain Warfare Center, and the Asymmetrical Warfare Group. This concept can be incorporated into the branch schools as well as continuing military education schools. Soldiers during training should be exposed to the full spectrum of conflict during the soldier institutional education experience.

Areas Which Require Additional Study

An area for additional study is further development of the yet to be published national security documents from the White House and the Department of Defense. This study used the current national security documents. With the new administration, the *2006 National Security Strategy* will soon be replaced. Additionally the *2004 National Military Strategy* will soon be replaced. The changes are unknown and they potentially could change the requirements and missions for the Army.

The most important aspect of training for future operations is leadership training. The demands on leaders have increased with the requirement to command and lead Soldiers in full spectrum operations. Officers must not only master basic soldier skills, leadership, and branch specific knowledge, but also understand the fundamentals of major combat operations, irregular warfare, peace operations, limited intervention, and peacetime military engagements.

Additionally, once the officers have the basic knowledge, they must be able to apply that knowledge to complex and changing environments. More important than ever is that institutional leadership training has to instill traits such as adaptability, initiative, decentralized operations, and problem solving. Because of all of these requirements, further study of how to train and develop the Army's leadership is needed.

Additional study is needed for which core tasks and competencies units need to train that can be adapted across the spectrum of operations. Future doctrine should provide a base list of core tasks to be trained in which commanders can build on or adjust as necessary. Leaders are responsible for training and each leader will train their unit differently but all must be able to succeed during the next mission given regardless of complexity.

In the face of complexity and the unknown, success of the Army in the next mission or conflict rest on a force that is adaptable. Training the adaptable force requires a core competency task list, an increased focus on leadership development, and training intangible skills such as initiative, discipline, and problem solving skills. This strategy mitigates the wide spectrum of operations the Army prepares for, a shortage of resources, and the unknown future operational environment.

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